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MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 
Vor.. XVI. APRIL, 1918 
THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
No.6. 
I NTERNATIONAL law has clearly reached a crisis in its devel-opment. For a period of nearly 300 years preceding the out-
break of the present war international law appeared to the cas-
ual observer· to have grown steadily and progressively. The student 
of history was able to point out certain clear and definite advances 
in the development of the law and assign them to particular dates. 
Grotius could be pronounced the Father of International Law, and 
the year 1625, which marked the appearance of his great treatise, 
could be set as the beginning of the modern period. A noticeable 
improvement in the law of neutrality could ·be traced in the prin-
ciples laid down· ·by Vattel in 1758 and ·by the First and Second 
Armed Neutrality of l78o and l8oo. The formation of the Holy 
Alliance marked a reaction in the policy of intervention. The De-
claration of Paris saw a reform in the rules of maritime war. And 
beginning with the Geneva Convention of 1864 down to the close 
of the Second Hague Conference a definite progress could be mark-
ed in the amelioration of the lot of non-combatants in war and in 
the restrictions put upon the methods and instruments of warfare; 
while as a check upon war itself arbitration courts had been pro· 
vided and a general pronouncement obtained from the natiom 
of the desirability of resorting to them. On the whole it seemed 
as if international law was developing with the times and adapting 
itself to modern ideals, and except on a few purely formal points it 
appeared to bear a fair comparison with the municipal law of the 
individual state. 
A rude awakening came with the month of August, 19!4. What. 
ever advances might have been set down to the credit of internation. 
al law within recent years the bald fact stood out that international 
law had failed to stand the pressure put upon it and had collapsed 
at the very moment of greatest need. Of what avail was an elabor~ 
ate law for times of peace if it was without authority to maintain 
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the condition of peace? Of what worth were restrictions upon the 
conduct of war when the restrictions, even if observed, still left war 
an evil of such vast proportions? The full measure of the illogical 
character of international law was thus taken in one swift moment 
of reflection. International law was clearly out of touch with the 
times. 
The failure of international law to respond to the demands made 
upon it has been ascribed to various causes: in the first place inter-
national law has been shown to the a law without effective sanction, 
and by comparison with the municipal law of the individual state 
this defect has been made sufficiently clear; others have pointed 
out that international courts must be created for the settlement of 
disputes between states and resort to them in a given case made ob-
ligatory upon the parties; others still have urged that a permanent 
international conference should remain in session at the Hague, en-
trusted with a general guardianship of international interests and 
ready to act as mediator when conflicts of claims arise between 
the nations. It is 'the purpose of the present paper to direct atten-
tion to a serious flaw in the sources from which the law is drawn, 
and to suggest a reform in the methods of law-making at present 
followed by the nations. 
The great body of international law has developed by what may 1be 
called an informal agreement of the nations. The rules of conduct 
which it prescribes, the rights and duties which it assigns to tlie states 
bound by it, are not the product of legislative enactment but have 
grown up by the slow process of common usage. This was neces-
sarily the case in a community of states recognizing no common 
political superior, no supra-national power possessing the authority 
to impose its laws upon subject communities. From the legal as well 
as the political point of view the nations are no more than a group 
of independent units voluntarily agreeing to observe certain rules 
to which they have given their implied or express· consent. These 
rules rest therefore upon a purely contractual basis, and have no 
element of the command of a political superior to a political infer-
ior regarded by Austin as essential to true law. Whether they can 
nevertheless meet the conditions of law as an historical fact is a 
question apart from our present purpose; they are in any case not 
law in the same sense in which that term is at present used within 
the boundaries of the individual state. 
Contract being the basis of international law we look for the 
sources of the law in the facts of international life which appear to 
embody an agreement of the nations to be bound by a given rule. 
The most important group of such facts are the practices of nations 
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which have been followed with sufficient regularity and consistency 
as to take the form of fixed custom. Custom thus embodies the im-
plied consent of the parties following it. It has its origin in the 
free practice of individual nations; then in time other nations are led 
from motives of convenience or from the pressure of moral com-
pulsion by their stronger neighbors to adopt the same practice, and 
in its last stage of development the particular rule has obtained 
sufficient standing to be quoted as a precedent for guidance in sub-
sequent cases. Thus- international law has followed more or less the 
lines of development of the early English common law, drawing its 
authority from tradition and testing the right of a particular claim 
not by the principles of abstract justice, but ·by the old familiar 
law of the land. It represents the legal relations of a community of 
states not yet sufficiently organized to define and codify their 
rights and obligations in detail, but nevertheless ready to appeal 
to the precedents of the past in proof of the legality of a claim in 
the present. 
But custom as a source of international law, and indeed the 
chief· source, is open to serious objections. The most serious of 
these objections is that customary law is an uncertain law. It is 
the culmination of a series of acts regularly observed and of prin-
ciples consistently followed. But how are we to determine the num-
ber of reiterated acts which constitutes regular observance, or the 
frequency of the appeal to a principle necessary to show general ac-
ceptance? There has been no central court of the nations ready, as 
in the case of the common law courts, to apply the rules of custom-
ary law and to distinguish between irregular practice and the tra-
ditional rule. What adds to the difficulty in the case of international 
law is that the number of nations being relatively small there have 
been too few cases presenting substantially the same facts to make it 
possible to deduce a common rule from them, unless it be one of the 
most general character. When the United States argued before the 
Geneva tribunal that it was the duty of a neutral to prevent its ports 
from being used as a base of supplies for her enemy anq as the 
starting point of hostile expeditions, her advocates could present 
no earlier cases in which that duty had been recognized under 
sufficiently similar circumstances to warrant an inference of legal 
obligation. The general principle appeared correct; its application to 
the particular facts was, although logical, nevertheless not familiar. 
In the absence of a code of recorded custom we turn to the other 
evidences of accepted usage, but find them deficient in many re-
spects. Jurists and scholars have undertaken to compile the rules 
of international law in force at the time of their writing, but the 
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record of international usage as presented in these treatises is not 
in all cases reliable. For it is only of recent years that writers 
as a body have adopted a strictly positive attitude towards inter-
national law. Many of the earlier works reflect the personal in-
terpretation of the author, and are more concerned with the ideal 
rule of conduct than with the rule actually observed. A careful 
study of the classic work of Vattel, which exercised wide influence 
in the latter part of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries 
fails to reveal any clear line between the actual law as exhibited in 
custom and the law as the author conceived it should be. And 
if we turn from treatises to the decisions of national and interna-
tional tribunals it is still more difficult to determine whether the 
rule followed by the court really represents the existing usage. In 
the case of national courts the theory is that international law is 
part of the law of the land and must be ascertained by the courts 
whenever cases involving such questions are presented to them. But 
few national courts have been altogether free from ·bias in their 
interpretation of the custom of nations. In the case of the Paquete 
Habana (175 U.S. 677) Mr. Justice Gray reviews the whole field of 
usage and treaty and juristic opinion in his search for the law on 
the status of captured enemy fishing vessels, and he reaches the con-
clusion, contrary to the claim of the United States, that their 
exemption from capture is "an established rule of international law" 
independently of any express agreement of the nations on the sub-
ject. A less liberal interpretation of custom may be seen in the case 
of the West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. Re:>: [1905] 2 K. 
B. 391, where the court refused to recognize as a rule of internation-
al law the obligation of a conquering nation to succeed to the debts 
of the conquered at the instance of a private creditor, in spite 
of the large body of evidence to show the existence of such a rule. 
This bias of national courts is particularly noticeable in the case of 
admiralty courts administering prize law, as in the judgments of the 
British courts during the Napoleonic wars and the United States 
courts during the American Civil War, where rules of contra-
band and blockade were laid down for which no general custom of 
the nations could possibly !be claimed. By contrast with national 
courts the decisions of international courts of arbitration would seem 
to offer more reliable evidence of the law. But the history of such 
cases shows that it has too often happened that the arbitral court 
has rendered its award rather in the form of a compromise sat-
isfactory to both parties than in the form of a judicial decision on 
the law. 
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In addition to the uncertainty of custom there are other difficul-
ties which impair its value as a source of international law. In 
the first place custom is of too slow growth to keep pace with the 
changing relations of the states which it endeavors to regulate. 
In the absence of international statutes sweeping aside the traditions 
of the customary law, as statutes of Parliament from time to time 
swept aside .the outworn traditions of the English common law, 
international law has in many of its important features lagged far 
behind the newer phases of international relations brought about 
by the social and commercial intercourse of modem times. The 
development of democratic and constitutional governments and the 
increasing complexity of international finance and trade have left 
the law of nations practically unchanged. The theory of the sover· 
eignty of the state is substantially what it was when states were, by 
comparison with present conditions, isolated units economically 
as well as politically independent. The tide of immigration from 
Europe to America which set in with the second quarter of the 19th 
century found the British and American courts still clinging to the 
old doctrine of indelible allegiance, and while the executive and 
legislative departments of the American government were struggling 
to introduce a new rule of expatriation more in accordance with the 
new conditions, the judicial department as expounder of the existing 
law remained unmoved. Even to-day it can scarcely be said that the 
right of expatriation is a principle of international law. 
Instances of this tendency of customary law to cling to the past 
might be multiplied indefinitely. Perhaps the most striking ex-
ample of its failure to adapt itself to the new conditions is to ·be 
found in the recent controversy ibetween the United States and the 
Teutonic powers with regard to the right of citizens of a neutral 
state to sell arms and ammunition to a belligerent. There can be no 
doubt that when Jefferson, in answer to the complaints of the 
British minister that French agents were buying arms in the United 
States, asserted in 1793 that such commerce was not in violation 
of the law of nations, his interpretation of neutral obligation was 
correct. The same position was taken by successive Secretaries 
of State during the 19th century, and as late as 1907 a formal con-
vention of the Second Hague Conference confirmed the traditional 
rule. Yet all the while the conditions of international life were 
changing and no account was taken of them. In the case of the 
United States as presented to the tribunal of arbitration at Geneva 
in 1871-2, an attempt was made by the United States to introduce an 
exception to the rule in cases where merchant vessels of the enemy 
had carried on in a neutral port such an extensive commerce in arti-
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des of war as to constitute the neutral port the main if not the 
only base of· military supplies. But the contention of the United 
States could not be applied as a rule of law simply because it dealt 
with circumstances which had not arisen before and with regard to 
which there were no precedents. By an odd coincidence the very 
argument made by the United States at Geneva was repeated by 
Germany in 1915. The German government contended in a mem-
orandum of April 4th that the United States was "the only neutral 
country in a position to furnish war materials" and that the con-
ception of neutrality was thereby "given a new purport, independ-
ently of the formal question of hitherto existing law"; moreover, 
"an entirely new industry" had been created. In reply the United 
States urged that the shipments of arms were in accordance with 
the _accepted law of neutrality, and that any change in such laws in 
time of war would be itself in violation of neutrality. Conceding 
the validity of the answer of the United States on the point of tra-
ditional law, it can scarcely be denied that conditions were such as 
to call for a new rule. !While the old law has the advantage of rend-
ering less necessary elaborate preparations for war in the case of 
a state to which neutral trade is accessible, it presents the anomaly of 
a nation legally neutral yet practically an ally of the enemy. 
A further defect of custom as a source of international law is 
its inability to reorganize a system which is defective as a whole, 
or even to amend certain parts of it along progressive lines look-
ing to the future. Most of the important reforms' of international 
law have come about by the action of a single state or group of 
states asserting rights not previously aclmowledged and maintain-
ing them in the face of opposition, until at last the inherent justice 
of the claim, aided by the power of the states supporting it, has 
come to obtain general acceptance. To cite one instance out of 
many, the rights and obligations of neutrality were far from clear 
when Jefferson laid down certain principles to be followed by the 
United States government during the war between France and 
Great Britian in 1793-4. A Neutrality Act was passed pronouncing 
definitely that certain acts, whether of citizen or of alien, would be 
considered by the United States as a violation of its neutrality, and 
penalizing them as crimes against the law of the state. That the 
law of the United States went beyond existing international obliga-
tions is unquestionable, but the principles it embodied in due time 
found their way into the general code of international conduct, and 
may now be found in various articles of the 5th and 13th Conven-
tions adopted at the Second Hague Conference. An additional 
instance is to ·be found in the principles advanced by the First and 
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Second "Armed Neutrality", which were first asserted in resistance 
to the practices of Great Britain, and which with one exception 
ultimately won general recognition as the correct rule of law. 
A second form of contractual obligation between the nations is 
the explicit acceptance of a given rule by the adoption of a formal 
treaty stipulating for it. But it must be noted, contrary to a com-
mon misconception, that treaties are only sources of international 
law when adopted ·by the nations as a body. Treaties between two 
individual nations embody merely the consent of the parties to them, 
and therefore have no effect upon the relations of other states. It 
has, however, happened that on a few points international law has 
developed from bilateral agreements between the states of the 
world taken two by two; in illustration of which may be mentioned 
the numerous treaties of extradition which have undoubtedly made 
the general practice of returning fugitive criminals an accepted rule 
of international law, though still lacking in recognition by the 
nations collectively. On the other hand it has sometimes happened 
that when all or a majority of the great powers have been parties 
to a treaty, as for example the Declaration of Paris of 1856, the 
weight of their influence has been thrown in favor of the adoption 
of the rule in question by other nations, so that in due time it has 
become part of the general law. This transition from limited to 
general law has sometimes ·been expressly provided for in the treaty 
itself ·by a clause inviting nations not parties to it to adhere to it. 
It is only since the meeting of the First Hague Conference in 
1899 that treaties have come to be a direct source of international 
law. At that Conference important agreements were entered into 
by the whole body of states, which gave universal application to 
certain existing usages of limited practice, abolished certain others, 
prescribed new rules of international conduct, defined rights and 
imposed definite obligations. The Hague Conference of 1907 went 
still further in concluding general conventions, though as in the 
case of the Conference of 1899 the agreements relate for the most 
part to the conduct of war. It -is important, however, to note that 
before those conventions can ·be regarded as part of the settled law, 
a condition attached to them, to the effect that a particular con-
vention may at any time be denounced by the parties to it upon 
giving due notice, must be removed. This may ·be done in either of 
two ways: by the direct rejection of the right of denunciation by 
means of a formal agreement to that effect, or ·by the gradual loss 
of the right when the subject-matter of the convention has grown 
into a rule of customary law. A further point of importance to be 
noted in judging of the authority of the Hague conventions is that 
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many of their provisions merely codify existing custom, and in 
consequence the rule so codified continues to be binding even though 
the formal convention should fail of ratification or be denounced 
after having been ratified. Hence the excuse made in the present 
war for the violation of certain provisions of the Hague conventions, 
that the particular convention had not been signed by all the bellig-
erents, is of no value if the rule was previously part of the custom-
ary law. 
In the face of the inherent defects in the sources from which 
international law is drawn it is not difficult to understand why the 
law has failed to keep in touch with the needs of the times. The 
problem now presented is whether the reform of the law can be 
accomplished along the lines follow(!d in the past or whether a new 
and more constructive system must be introduced in the form of an 
international legislative body capable of amending old rules and 
introducing new ones by authoritative degree. It is doubtful if the 
nations will continue to be satisfied with the old methods. What 
statutes have done for the development of the common law the acts 
of an international parliament must do for the development of inter-
national law. Rights and duties must be more definitely defined, 
the restrictions upon the sovereignty of the state, now a sort of 
twilight zone in international relations, must be brought out into 
the light, and a clear rule of intervention, no longer individual but 
collective, must be adopted. The equality of nations must be given 
a legal meaning and outworn theories, long since negatived in prac-
tice, must be formally discarded. Rights of property, at present in 
a state of utter confusion, must be rearranged and systematized to 
meet the demands of international peace. Present treaty rights 
must be changed to give them, in respect to interpretation and 
binding force, more of the status of contract at private law. These 
and other radical amendments in the law are vitally needed, and 
the slow process of customary observance together with the con-
ditional and half-hearted agreements of the Hague conventions are 
simply inadequate to bring them about. 
It is not difficult to understand that if the substance of interna-
tional law can be amended so as to give greater clearness and pre-
cision to the rights and obligations of nations the settlement of in-
ternational disputes by judicial methods will be greatly facilitated. 
However perfect the machinery of courts of arbitration, it cannot 
be expected that the nations will resort freely to them in the ab-
sence of a more definite code of law. Hitherto the nations have 
been asked to submit their claims to a court possessing no judicial 
traditions and no recognized rule of decision, and in consequence 
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where arbitration has been resorted to in the past it has frequently 
been necessary for the parties to frame a special agreement in ad-
vance stipulating the principles which are to govern the decision of 
the case. The difficulty of framing this rule has often 'been as great 
as the difficulty of obtaining the consent of the parties to arbitrate. 
Moreover in the case of general arbitration treaties which provide 
for the settlement of future disputes the exceptions from the agree-
ment to arbitrate, noticeable in the treaties of 19o8, of questions 
relating to honor and vital interests are without logical foundation, 
except in so far as many of the important rights of. nations are still 
in a state of uncertainty. The distinction between justiciable and 
non-justiciable questions is likewise called for by the defects of the 
law. All questions between citizen and citizen of the state are 
justiciable, and all questions between nations could in point of law 
be made so if the law were clear upon the rights and obligations of 
the parties. What are commonly called political disputes, and as 
such not regarded as susceptible of decision by arbitral courts, are 
nothing more than the conflicting claims of nations in cases where 
there. is no definite rule of decision. They are disputes arising out 
of the old theory of sovereignty which has stubbornly held its own 
through all the modem period of international development. They 
can be brought under the law only when the source from which they 
spring has been subjected to legal restrictions. 
The establishment of an international court of arbitration with 
truly judicial functions is one of the most important demands of 
the new era of international reorganization. But this court, as we 
have seen, is largely dependent upon the existence of an interna-
tional legislature, if it is to extend its jurisdictio~ over the many 
cases now excluded from it. Nothing less than the enactment of 
positive rules of law will succeed in establishing the international 
court in a position of authority over the states in those cases where 
recourse to a court of justice is most needed. In the future the 
development of the substantive law must, if not precede, at least go 
hand in hand with the development of. the law of procedure. 
CHARLES G. FENWICK. 
Bryn Mawr College. 
